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A “third wave” of environmental policy has recently emerged that emphasizes information 
provision as an integral part of the risk mitigation strategy. While theory suggests that 
information programs may correct market failures and improve welfare, the empirical 
effectiveness of these programs remains largely undetermined. We show that mandatory 
information disclosure programs in the electricity industry achieve stated policy goals. We find 
that the average proportion of fossil fuels decreases and the average proportion of clean fuels 
increases in response to disclosure programs. However, the programs also produce unintended 
consequences. Customer composition and pre-existing fuel mix significantly affect program 
response, suggesting that effective information disclosure policies may not be efficient. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Developed nations’ environmental policies have evolved substantially in the last several 
decades. Early pollution control programs involved command and control approaches. Policies 
then frequently included pollution charges, tradable permits, and other market based instruments. 
Most recently, a “third wave” of environmental policy has emerged that emphasizes information 
provision as an integral part of the risk mitigation strategy. Here, (further) government regulation 
is replaced or augmented by publicly provided information presumed to assist more cost 
effective private market and legal forces. Common examples include the toxics release 
inventory, lead paint disclosures, drinking water quality notices, and eco-labels. The empirical 
effectiveness of such programs, however, remains largely undetermined. This paper examines 
the impact of a prominent mandatory disclosure program on the fuel mix percentages of large 
electric utility corporations. 
The prominence of mandatory information policies is not restricted to environmental 
arenas. For example, OECD countries’ equity markets generally require firm-level financial 
information provision. In many countries, agricultural goods require country of origin and other 
health labels. Restaurants are increasingly required to display hygiene grade cards. Domestic 
colleges and universities are required by law to inform current and prospective students of crime 
statistics, equity data, and performance metrics. Even significant medical errors must now be 
disclosed to the community. 
There are several potential advantages of information provision policies, and theory 
suggests that disclosure programs may effectively achieve their goals. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
provided a survey of the evidence in capital markets. Brouhle and Khanna (2007) demonstrated 
that information provision can improve product quality. In the environmental area, Kennedy et   3
al. (1994), Arora and Gangopadhyay (1999), Maxwell et al. (2000), Kirchoff (2000), and Khanna 
(2001) showed that the provision of information about pollution may correct a market failure, 
improve performance, and be welfare improving.  
Despite the literature’s theoretical findings, the empirical effects of disclosure programs 
remain inconclusive. Early studies of securities regulation found mixed results. See Stigler 
(1964), Robbins and Werner (1964), and Benston (1973). A more recent literature suggested that 
disclosure programs in financial markets can achieve their desired effects; La Porta et al. (2006) 
and Greenstone et al. (2006) found that both market size and market returns were positively 
influenced by mandatory disclosure programs. In product quality settings, Chipty and Witte 
(1998) established that resource and referral agencies significantly influenced child care prices, 
but had no impact on the quality of care. In contrast, Jin and Leslie (2003) found that mandatory 
hygiene grade cards positively affected restaurant quality and health outcomes. Broadly, Weil et 
al. (2006) performed eight case studies of regulatory disclosure programs and concluded that 
transparency policies can be effective, but results are highly sensitive to context. 
Studies of environmental performance yielded similarly mixed results. Desvousges, 
Smith, and Rink (1992) found that information-based programs influenced attitudes favorable to 
radon testing, but testing itself only increased when mass media dissemination was coupled with 
community-based implementation programs. Konar and Cohen (1997) and Khanna et al. (1998) 
found that stock movements associated with Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) announcements led 
to increased abatement and reduced emissions. However, Bui (2005) found that the declines in 
emissions after TRI reporting events may have been attributable to regulation rather than 
investor pressure. Bennear and Olmstead (2006) found that drinking water quality notices 
lowered violations for some systems, but not others.   4
This paper is the first empirical economic study of the effectiveness of information 
provision in the electric utility industry. Environmental disclosure programs in electricity 
markets are a promising area of exploration for the efficacy of information policies for several 
reasons. First, electricity is a homogeneous commodity. From a consumption point of view, there 
are no differences in the characteristics of green or brown electricity. Therefore, this setting 
allows us to directly attribute program-induced changes to agent preferences. This is not true in 
much of the broader literature. For example, if eco- or organic- labeled products gain market 
share, it is difficult to establish whether consumers are expressing preferences for environmental 
improvement or whether consumers perceive other differences in product quality (like health, 
safety, and taste). Second, electric utilities are among the leading polluters in the United States. 
For example, about 40 percent of domestic CO2 and 67 percent of SO2 emissions are attributable 
to electricity generation.
1 Utilities are also the largest source of anthropogenic mercury 
emissions. Third, electric disclosure programs exhibit a number of features desirable for 
econometric identification. For example, the programs were adopted at the state-level and 
progressively introduced over time, so all firms were not impacted uniformly.  
To what extent did mandatory disclosure laws affect the environmental performance of 
the electric utility industry? We address the question by examining monthly firm-level fuel mix 
and program data from 145 of the largest investor-owned electric utility companies for the period 
1995-2003. We first analyze how firms’ fuel mix percentages respond to mandatory disclosure 
programs. Panel data techniques allow us to identify disclosure program effects separately from 
the effects of other state and local programs like Renewable Portfolio Standards. We also correct 
for the potential statistical endogeneity of the program variable using fixed effects and 
                         
1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1999 National Emissions Inventory.   5
instrumental variables. We then explore the detected response in more detail. We use OLS and 
IV interaction models to explore the effect of customer composition on disclosure responses and 
standard and IV conditional quantile regressions to examine how the entire fuel mix distribution 
shifts. 
We find three main results. First, mandatory disclosure programs can affect fuel-mix 
outcomes. We find that the average proportion of fuel usage attributable to fossil fuels 
substantially decreases and the average proportion of fuel usage attributable to clean fuels 
significantly increases in response to disclosure programs in the electric utility industry. Second, 
customer composition significantly impacts disclosure response. We find that firms’ clean fuel 
program responses become considerably stronger (more positive) as the firm proportionately 
serves more residential customers. Firms’ fossil fuel program responses become weaker (less 
negative) as they proportionately serve more residential customers. In other words, as firms 
proportionately serve more residential consumers, any nuclear program responses become 
weaker (less positive). Third, pre-existing fuel mix significantly impacts disclosure program 
response. Our results suggest that firms that already use substantial amounts of clean fuels most 
significantly increase clean fuel percentages in response to disclosure programs. Similarly, firms 
that already use relatively small amounts of fossil fuels most significantly decrease fossil fuel 
usage in response to disclosure programs. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the electric 
utility industry and its disclosure programs. Section 3 discusses economic theories explaining 
why information disclosure programs may alter environmental performance. Section 4 describes 
our Energy Information Administration and Interstate Renewable Energy Council data. Section 5 
presents an empirical foundation. In Section 6, we first analyze how firm-level fuel mix   6
percentages respond to mandatory disclosure programs. We then explore the detected response in 
more detail. Section 7 provides a concluding discussion. 
2.  Background 
2.1  Fuel Mix in the Electric Utility Industry  
In 2004, domestic electricity generation totaled 3,953,407 gigawatt hours. Of total 
generation, 50 percent was attributable to coal, 18 percent was attributable to gas, and 3 percent 
was attributable to oil. Nuclear sources generated nearly 20 percent of electricity. Cleaner energy 
sources, like hydropower, biomass, geothermal, solar and wind, generated approximately 9 
percent (Edison Electric Institute 2005). 
Renewable fuel use has trended upward since the fuels’ widespread debut in 1993. More 
than 600 electric utilities currently offer green power options to their customers, and Lamarre 
(1997) and Delmas et al. (2007) found a distinct market niche for renewable energy even at a 
price premium. Renewable capacity is quite variable across both space and time. For example, in 
2003, many states, including CA, NY, ME, and VT, had green energy generation proportions in 
excess of 20 percent (USDOE (2003)). In 2004, although it remained a small portion of total 
electricity generation, wind power usage increased 27 percent. 
2.2  Mandatory Information Disclosure Programs in the Electric Utility Industry 
  In the U.S. electricity industry, information disclosure refers to the mandatory provision 
of fuel mix percentages and pollution discharge statistics to utility consumers. For example, 
Minnesota’s Public Utilities Commission decreed:   7
“The Commission recognizes that there is a need for the consumer to be informed 
and educated on environmental issues and that all Minnesota utilities’ customers 
... should have similar access to information.” (Minnesota PUC, 2002) 
The state issued an order requiring regulated utilities to disclose information on fuel mix and air 
emissions to customers. Twice annually, utilities must include a bill insert that contains a pie 
chart depicting the mix of fuel sources, a bar chart of air pollutant emissions, a chart of costs 
associated with different generating sources, and a discussion of energy efficiency measures. 
Further, the utility must list a phone number and web address on all bills so that consumers can 
access environmental information. Other states’ disclosure programs are similarly motivated and 
implemented, although specific details may vary. For example, several states’ disclosure 
programs require quarterly (rather than biannual) inserts. 
Figure 1 indicates which states had disclosure programs in 2005. By that year, 25 states 
had adopted generation disclosure rules, and these states represented over 65 percent of the 
United States population. Since consumer preferences may factor into disclosure effectiveness, 
programs may be particularly meaningful in deregulated states. Indeed, 23 of the 25 state-level 
disclosure programs were enacted in deregulated states, including NY, IL, TX, MI, AZ, NM, and 
much of the mid-Atlantic and northeastern regions. Additionally, Colorado and Florida instituted 
mandatory disclosure programs despite failing to deregulate their industries.  
 
 
   8
Figure 1. State Generation Disclosure Rules – September 2005 
 
Source: Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE). 
Accessible online at http://www.dsireusa.org/. 
2.3  Other Information Programs in the Electric Utility Industry 
In addition to the mandatory state-level disclosure programs that are the focus of this 
study, many electric utilities must comply with other information requirements. Most notably, 
“major” firms are required to file Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Form Number 1, the 
Annual Report for Major Electric Utilities, each and every year.
2 These reports average 140 
pages and contain general corporate information, financial statements, supporting schedules, and 
information on environmental investments. In addition, electric utilities are required to provide 
information about their environmental performance to the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Although all of the 
aforementioned data is publicly accessible through government databases, users typically must 
have environmental and database expertise to interpret the information. In marked contrast, 
                         
2 Major electric utilities are classified as those with annual sales or transmission service that exceeds one of 
the following: (1) one million megawatt hours of total annual sales, (2) 100 megawatt hours of annual sales for 
resale, (3) 500 megawatt hours of gross interchange out, or (4) 500 megawatt hours of wheeling for others 
(deliveries plus losses). 
D.C.
State has a Disclosure Rule  9
disclosure programs are designed explicitly to produce easily accessible and readily interpretable 
environmental information.  
3.  Theories Linking Disclosure and Environmental Performance 
We will present evidence that information disclosure programs alter fuel mix outcomes in 
the electricity industry. Indeed, altering fuel mix and reducing air pollution emissions was the ky 
declared intention of the state agencies that issued the policies. Several theories allow for a link 
between mandatory information disclosure programs and environmental performance.
3 
Perhaps the simplest theoretical explanations entail increased community coercion or 
investor or employee pressure. In the presence of information on the relative environmental 
performance of a given firms, community activists may lobby for future regulation or attempt to 
harm the firm’s reputation with the consuming public (indirectly reducing demand). Employee 
turnover and dissatisfaction may result from disclosed poor environmental performance 
(Tietenberg (1998)). Investors may express environmental preferences or concerns over future 
environmental regulation by decreasing demand for shares (Khanna et al. (1998)). However, the 
information provided by disclosure programs in the electricity industry is typically already 
available to highly motivated and trained experts like lawyers, investors, and community 
activists. 
A more compelling theory, then, for the link between information and environmental 
performance in the electricity industry might involve the threat of future regulation or legal 
action. In a dynamic political economy context, disclosure programs may simply signal the 
state’s willingness to impose future regulations on the industry unless firms self-regulate. 
                         
3 See Khanna (2001) for an excellent overview of the literature on non-mandatory environmental policies, 
including information disclosure programs.   10
Similarly, disclosure programs may increase a reporting firm’s susceptibility to liability under 
legal statutes. Segerson and Miceli (1998) and Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) explore 
firms’ incentives to preempt future regulation or legal liability.  
Perhaps the most persuasive theory for the link between disclosure and environmental 
performance is a direct demand effect. In the presence of simple, easily interpretable, and 
directly provided information, consumers may increase demand for fuels perceived as 
environmentally favorable and decrease demand for fuels perceived as environmentally 
unfavorable. Of course, this mechanism requires: (1) that information affects consumer 
awareness, (2) that consumer awareness can translate to changes in demand, and (3) current or 
future consumer choice among electricity products. However, the mechanism does not require 
choice among electricity providers.  
An emerging literature suggests that consumer awareness changes in response to 
environmental information and that shifts in awareness can translate in behavioral changes. 
Desvousges, Smith, and Rink (1992), Blamey et al. (2000), Loureiro (2003), Loureiro and 
Lotade (2005), and Leire and Thidell (2005) all demonstrate shifts in consumer awareness after 
exposure to environmental information or eco-labels. In our context, disclosed information may 
remind consumers of the consequences of their own actions, notify customers that alternative 
fuels exist and are widely used, and demonstrate the variability in utilities’ fuel mix percentages 
and emissions. Teisl, Roe, and Hicks (2002) and Shimshack, Ward, and Beatty (2006) establish 
that changes in environmental awareness can be translated into new consumption patterns. More 
broadly, Stigler and Becker (1977) provide a general framework for information to enter a 
consumer demand framework. Here, information is viewed as an input in the household 
production function of Lancaster (66) and Michael & Becker (73).   11
Consumers increasingly have the option to purchase greener energy at a price premium, 
and therefore increasingly have choice among consumer products. Thiry-six states and over 600 
utilities currently offer green power pricing programs where consumers can support cleaner 
energy usage in exchange for an electricity price increase.
4 Further, there are dozens of 
certificate programs (many at the national level) that allow consumers to purchase green 
certificates or green tags that require the replacement of traditional types of energy with greener 
alternatives. These certificates are available whether or not the consumer has direct access to 
green power options from their own provider. Note also that the direct demand mechanism does 
not require customer choice across electricity providers, i.e. if information provision shifts 
consumers’ relative marginal willingness to pay curve for different energy products, firms’ 
marginal revenue calculations change and a new equilibrium will result. In fact, many utilities 
were very interested in disclosure programs when they were being considered since such policies 
allowed firms to “distinguish their price structure, fuel mix, or environmental profile in the eyes 
of the consumer and found mandatory standard labels to be a credible way to do that.” (NCCEI 
2002) In other words, disclosure programs were perceived as an effective and particularly 
convincing way to price discriminate. 
Of course, all theories linking disclosure programs and fuel mix percentages in the 
electric utility industry require that supply of a given fuel type category is not completely 
inelastic. In other words, firms must be able to realistically alter their fuel mix portfolios in the 
short- to medium- run. On the margin, at least, they can. While purchasing or building new 
facilities may be required to dramatically alter fuel mix portfolios, relatively small portfolio 
                         
4 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy pages. Retrieved October 2006 
from http://www.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/.   12
shifts are easily obtainable. First, utilities can alter their capacity utilization. Second, major 
electric utilities can buy and sell power generation in response to changing market conditions.
5 
Thus, several theories can explain the link between information disclosure and 
environmental performance. Empirically, we will follow the broader information literature and 
estimate the general impact of mandatory information programs. Regressions of quantity on 
information variables (and other covariates) are identified under any of the mechanisms 
discussed above, and an identified response represents the impact of disclosure programs on the 
equilibrium quantity of electricity generated from the specifically analyzed fuel source. 
4.  Data 
4.1  Data sources and content 
Our research assesses the impact of environmental disclosure programs on the fuel mix 
percentages of major electric utility firms. We focus on fuel mix indicators from the electric 
power industry for three reasons. First, utilities are among the nation’s leading sources of 
pollution. Second, fuel mix is the most readily identifiable and interpretable measure of 
environmental performance on disclosure program bill inserts and web postings. Third, 
information disclosure programs are heterogeneous, yet all require generation mix provision. 
We analyze data from the Energy Information Administrations (EIA)’s Annual Electric 
Power Industry Database and the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC)’s Database of 
                         
5 While expanded production on the margin is more transparent for traditional fuel sources, nuclear 
facilities also regularly increase generation on the margin. First, net unit capability is altered by reducing unplanned 
outages and decreasing planned outage time through improved maintenance. In the mid-1990s, average nuclear unit 
capability was approximately 82 percent. By the early 2000s, capability increased to approximately 90 percent. 
Second, nuclear power output is frequently increased via the use of more productive inputs, more efficient use of 
feedwater flow, and equipment modifications.   13
State Incentives for Renewable Energy. Fuel mix data come from forms EIA-906 (and its 
predecessor EIA-759), the monthly utility electric power plant reports. We focus on production-
based fuel mix rather than sales-based fuel mix to identify actual changes in environmental 
quality. Firm characteristics are obtained from forms EIA-861, the annual electric power industry 
reports. Disclosure program information comes directly from IREC’s Database. Since it is 
possible that other state-level programs like Renewable Portfolio Standards and Green Power 
initiatives may impact utilities’ fuel mix percentages, we also analyze other program data from 
the IREC database. 
4.2 The  Sample 
  Our final sample includes monthly information from the 145 major investor-owned 
electric utility companies with relatively complete data in EIA databases.  We focus on large 
investor-owned firms because these companies represent the majority of industry electricity and 
pollution generation. Further, EIA data (EIA-906 and EIA-759) is imputed for smaller 
companies based upon information from these larger firms. All firms with at least one plant with 
a capacity of 50 megawatts or more (25 megawatts or more prior to 1999), all firms with nuclear 
generation, and all firms with significant renewable capacity file reports with the EIA for each 
and every month of operation. Since our data represent the big incumbents in the electric utility 
industry, the results of our analysis should be extrapolated to smaller firms with a degree of 
caution. We focus on the firm level (as opposed to the plant-level) since management decisions 
are centralized and disclosure program requirements operate at the company-level. 
We observe fuel mix percentages and program variables for our 145 firms for the 108 
months spanning 1995-2003. Our sample begins in 1995 in order to obtain pre-program   14
information for all impacted states; the first disclosure program was enacted in mid-1997. The 
sample concludes in 2003 because we were unable to obtain reliable data for 2004. 
4.3 Summary  Statistics 
Conditional on positive generation, aggregate fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas) represent 
approximately 74 percent of generation over our entire sample. Aggregate clean fuels 
(renewables, hydroelectric) represent approximately 9 percent and nuclear represents 
approximately 17 percent.
6 Our sample numbers closely correspond to total national generation 
proportions for the sample period. 
Additional summary statistics, broken down by disclosure status for those firms with 
complete fuel mix data for all periods, are presented in Table 1. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses. Table 1 indicates that the percentage of generation attributable to clean fuels 
decreases for those firms never subject to mandatory disclosure but increases for those firms 
subject to disclosure at some point during our sample period. Similarly, Table 1 indicates that the 
percentage of generation attributable to fossil fuels increases for those firms never subject to 
mandatory disclosure but decreases for those firms subject to disclosure at some point during our 
sample period. 
                         
6 Here and throughout the paper, we refer to fuels as “clean” if they generate low levels of common air 
pollutants relative to fossil fuels and are not nuclear. This definition is debatable, but consistent with issuing 
agencies’ goals that emphasize air quality over other environmental or social objectives.   15
Table 1. Mean Fuel Mix Percentage Statistics 
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Results in Table 1 are highly suggestive of disclosure program effects on fuel mix 
outcomes, but the differences are not typically statistically significant. Additionally, these simple 
summary statistics do not control for numerous cross-firm and other differences that may impact 
changes in fuel mix outcomes over time. Consequently, we must conduct a more careful analysis 
in order to understand the impact of information disclosure programs on the environmental 
performance of the electric utility sector.  
5.  Primary Methods 
Our overall empirical strategy is to use panel data techniques to exploit within-firm 
temporal variation in program status to analyze the effect of mandatory disclosure programs on 
fuel mix percentages. First, using ordinary least squares and instrumental variables regression 
methods, we demonstrate that disclosure programs significantly reduce the proportion of fossil 
fuel usage and significantly increase the percentage of clean fuel usage. Second, we examine the 
disclosure response in more detail. We use OLS and IV regressions with interactions to 
demonstrate that the impact of information programs on the proportion of clean fuel usage is 
significantly greater when firms have proportionately greater sales to residential customers. We   16
then use standard and IV conditional quantile regressions to explore the impact of disclosure 
programs on the entire range of the fuel mix distribution. We establish that firms that use 
relatively small amounts of fossil fuels most significantly decrease fossil fuel percentages in 
response to mandatory programs.  
5.1 Primary  Variables 
Our key dependent variables represent fuel mix percentages. For example, the continuous 
dependent variable may signify the percentage of the firm’s generation in a given month 
attributable to fossil fuels, including coal, oil, and natural gas. The dependent variable may also 
frequently denote the percentage of the firm’s generation in a given month attributable to the 
clean fuels, including hydroelectricity and renewable fuels like wind, solar, and biomass. In other 
cases, the dependent variable represents the percentage of the firm’s electricity generation 
attributable to nuclear power. 
Our key explanatory measure is a continuous variable representing the proportion of the 
firm’s sales that are subject to an operational or effective mandatory disclosure program. If all of 
a firm’s sales are subject to disclosure requirements in a given month, this explanatory variable 
takes a value of 1. If only 80 percent of a firm’s electricity sales are subject to disclosure in a 
given month (such that 20 percent of company sales go to states without operational disclosure 
programs), this variable takes a value of 0.80.  
Analyses also include several other explanatory variables. Fixed effects allow us to 
capture systematic firm differences due to factors such as size, age, community characteristics, 
management profiles, average regulatory stringency, and ownership type. Fixed effects also 
capture differences in input and output prices due to factors like distance to fossil fuel markets   17
and state-level variation in taxation. Plant production varies seasonally, so we include quarterly 
dummy variables. Finally, we include flexible annual dummies to account for broad trends in 
prices, technological change, and other factors. 
5.2  Basic Regression Model 
The basic regression model is yit = Ditδ + Xitβ +αi + εit, where i indexes the unit of 
observation (a firm) and t indexes time (months). yit represents the percentage of firm i’s 
generation in period t attributable to the fuel source being analyzed. Dit represents the proportion 
of firm i’s sales that are subject to an effective disclosure program in period t. The elements of 
the vector Xit include all of the non-program explanatory variables discussed above. αi is an 
unobserved time invariant individual effect and εit is the usual time variant idiosyncratic shock. 
5.3 Consistency  Considerations 
A potential concern with our key program Dit variable is that it may be statistically 
endogenous. For example, consider the possibility that the likelihood of program adoption is a 
function of the average environmental performance of the large electric utilities operating within 
the state. In terms of the basic regression model, the concern is that the time invariant individual 
effect αi is correlated with the program variable Dit. However, fixed effects prevent bias from 
this type of correlation. In our context, the inclusion of fixed effects prohibits the possibility of 
bias introduced when program adoption is a function of the temporal average fuel mix of the 
firm.  
It is also possible that the program variable Dit is correlated with the time variant error 
term εit. For example, consider the possibility that states choose to adopt disclosure programs in 
periods in which large electric utilities operating within that state are utilizing more fossil fuels   18
than usual. A standard correction for this type of statistical endogeneity is instrumental variables. 
Our chosen instrument is the weighted average of program status in states near those states in 
which the particular firm operates. Two assumptions are required for the validity of this 
instrument. First, states base policy choices in part on decisions of other nearby states. Second, 
states do not base policy choices on the contemporaneous environmental performance of firms in 
other states. To be conservative, we eliminate states directly upwind and directly downwind from 
the states in which the particular firm operates.
7  
6.  Empirical Analysis 
6.1  Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Regressions 
Do disclosure programs affect fuel mix percentages on average? Our goal here is to 
investigate the relationship between disclosure programs and firm’s fossil fuel and clean fuel 
usage. Thus, we regressed fuel mix proportion measures on the percent of a firm’s sales subject 
to disclosure requirements and other covariates. Simultaneous estimation of the multiple fuel mix 
equations through a SUR regression would yield no efficiency gain, since the covariates in each 
equation are identical. For each equation, we ran both fixed effects linear regressions and fixed 
effects instrumental variables regressions. Results are presented in Table 2. All computed 




                         
7 Upwind and downwind states are determined by following prevailing westerly, southwesterly, and 
southerly winds. Pollution transport follows these winds fairly closely. See, for example, the Ozone Transport 
Assessment Group (OTAG)’s Map of Ozone Pollution Transport, available online as the Air Quality Analysis 
Workgroup Results Summary at http://capita.wustl.edu/OTAG/ . 
8 Later quantile regressions suggest that slope parameters are sensitive the distribution of the dependent 
variables, suggesting the presence of heteroskedasticity.   19
Table 2. Firm-Level Regression Results: Aggregate 
  Dependent Variable: Percentage of 
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a The dependent variables are the percentage of fuel mix attributable to the source indicated in the column heading. 
The key independent variable, the disclosure program variable, ranges from 0 to 1. It indicates the percentage of 
firm sales subject to operational disclosure programs. 
b Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
c All analyses consist of 14,168 observations from 145 firms over the 108 sample months. 
 
Results in Table 2 indicate that the estimated impact of an operational disclosure program 
is negative and significant at the 1 percent level for fossil fuel production. The results are also 
economically significant. As the proportion of the average firm’s sales subject to disclosure 
increases 1 percent, the average proportion of generation attributable to fossil fuels drops   20
between 0.05 percentage points (OLS point estimate) and 0.13 percentage points (IV point 
estimate).   
Similarly, results in Table 2 indicate that the estimated impact of an operational 
disclosure program is positive and significant at the 1 percent level for clean sources like 
hydroelectric and renewables. As the proportion of the average firm’s sales subject to disclosure 
increases 1 percent, the average proportion of generation attributable to clean fuels increases 
between 0.02 percentage points (OLS point estimate) and 0.15 percentage points (IV point 
estimate).
9  
Results in Table 2 also demonstrate the potential statistical endogeneity of the program 
variable. In the ordinary least squares regressions, clean fuel coefficients were negatively biased 
and fossil fuel coefficients were positively biased. Results suggest the presence of time variant 
correlation between the program variable and the error term. Specifically, disclosure program 
adoption may have been most likely when fossil fuel usage was particularly high and clean fuel 
usage was particularly low. 
As expected, seasonality appears to play a role in fuel mix percentages. The proportion of 
fossil fuel usage is higher and the proportion of clean fuel usage is lower in the late summer and 
fall months. We also find that fuel mix decisions appear to trend over time, although non-
linearly.  Systematic differences across firms also exist, as firm specific intercepts differ 
substantially. 
                         
9 Disaggregated results for specific fuel sources mimic these aggregate results. There is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between disclosure programs and the proportional use of the fossil fuels coal and 
gas. There is a statistically significant positive relationship between disclosure programs and the proportional use of 
renewable and hydroelectric generation. Results also suggest a modest positive relationship between disclosure 
programs and the proportional use of nuclear electricity generation (categorized as neither fossil fuel nor clean fuel 
and therefore omitted from Table 2), but the relationship is not statistically significant. Disaggregated results are 
available upon request from the authors.   21
6.2 Sensitivity  Analysis 
The obvious concern with the preceding results is omitted variables. Perhaps other factors 
and government programs impacting fuel mix outcomes in the electric utility industry are driving 
the results in Table 2. However, omitted variables will not bias our results unless they are 
systematically correlated with disclosure program introductions. Disclosure programs exhibit 
considerable heterogeneity across both space and time. Therefore, significant bias requires that 
other government programs impacting fuel mix are passed at approximately the same time as 
disclosure in each state. Other concerns with the preceding results may include variable 
definitions, model structure, and the precise nature of the ‘event.’ Below, we provide evidence 
that the results in Table 2 are robust to a number of sensitivity considerations. 
Deregulation 
  Joskow (1998) noted that restructuring of electricity supply has the potential to 
significantly impact industry fuel mix outcomes. As noted in the background section, the vast 
majority of disclosure programs were enacted in deregulated states at some point after 
restructuring. Only two states, CO and FL, instituted mandatory disclosure programs without 
restructuring their electricity industries. Consequently, it is possible that omitting deregulation 
may bias our results. Table 3 reports results from robust instrumental variable regressions 
augmented with the percent of firm’s sales in deregulated states. 
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Table 3. Instrumental Variable Regressions: Deregulation 
  Dependent variables
 
  Percent Fossil Fuels
  Percent Clean Fuels
  Percent Nuclear
 
 
   












Season Dummies  3 Season Dummies 
Year Dummies  8 Year Dummies
 
Fixed Effects  144 Firm-Level Fixed Effects 
 
a The dependent variables are the percentage of fuel mix attributable to the source indicated in the column heading. 
The key independent variable, the disclosure program variable, ranges from 0 to 1. It indicates the percentage of 
firm sales subject to operational disclosure programs. 
b Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
c All analyses consist of 14,168 observations from 145 firms over the 108 sample months. 
 
  Results in Table 3 indicate that disclosure programs impacts are similar in sign and 
significance, and larger in magnitude, when deregulation variables are added to the analysis.
10 As 
the proportion of the average firm’s sales subject to disclosure increases 1 percent, the average 
proportion of generation attributable to fossil fuels decreases approximately 0.23 percentage 
points and the average proportion of generation attributable to clean fuels increases 0.27 
percentage points. The average proportion of generation attributable to nuclear seems to increase, 
but changes are not statistically significant. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards and Other Programs 
  Other state and local regulations and financial incentives may also impact firms’ fuel mix 
percentages. Examples include Renewable Portfolio Standards, Mandatory Green Power 
Initiatives, and tax incentives. However, the adoption of these programs does not generally 
closely coincide with the adoption of disclosure across time. As a sensitivity analysis, however, 
                         
10 Ideally, one might also interact disclosure program variables with deregulation indicators to see if 
program responses become stronger in restructured markets. However, since only 2 states implemented disclosure 
without restructuring, such results are quite sensitive to model specification.    23
we tested whether other prominent state-level programs targeting utilities’ fuel mixes impacted 
our key results.  
  Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) typically mandate tradeable credit programs with 
fixed quotas for renewable generation. We examined whether the inclusion of a variable for the 
introduction of RPS changed our disclosure results, suggesting the presence of omitted variable 
bias. Instrumental variable coefficients for the disclosure program variable were extremely 
similar (signs, significance, and point estimates) to the results presented in Tables 2 and 3. For 
example, when variables indicating the percent of the firm’s sales subject to RPS are included, 
the disclosure program coefficient for the clean fuel response is 0.159 (t-statistic 3.96) and the 
coefficient for the fossil fuel response is -0.128 (t-statistic -2.51).  
Mandatory green power policies require utilities operating in the state to offer and 
publicize green power options to consumers. When variables indicating the percent of the firm’s 
sales subject to mandatory green power initiatives are included in the analysis, results were once 
again very similar (signs, significance, and point estimates) to the results presented in Tables 2 
and 3. The disclosure program coefficient for the clean fuel response is 0.145 (t-statistic 3.78) 
and the coefficient for the fossil fuel response is -0.129 (t-statistic -2.64).  
State and local sales and corporate tax credits and exemptions for green energy 
generation are becoming increasingly prominent. Again, the adoption of these programs does not 
generally closely coincide with the adoption of disclosure across time. When variables indicating 
the percent of the firm’s sales subject to state corporate or sales taxes for green power are 
included in the analysis, results were once again very similar (signs, significance, and point 
estimates) to the results presented in Tables 2 and 3. When sales tax incentives for green power 
are included, the disclosure program coefficient for the clean fuel response is 0.123 (t-statistic   24
3.86) and the coefficient for the fossil fuel response is -0.103 (t-statistic -2.42). When corporate 
tax incentives for green power are included, the disclosure program coefficient for the clean fuel 
response is 0.170 (t-statistic 4.63) and the coefficient for the fossil fuel response is -0.127 (t-
statistic -2.75).  
Not surprisingly, when all other program variables (RPS, Mandatory Green Power, Sales 
Tax Exemptions, and Corporate Tax Incentives) are included in the analysis, results remain very 
similar (signs, significance, and point estimates) to the results presented in Table 2. The 
disclosure program coefficient for the clean fuel response is 0.155 (t-statistic 4.93) and the 
coefficient for the fossil fuel response is -0.101 (t-statistic -2.44). 
Sensitivity to Other Assumptions 
  In addition to omitted variable concerns, one possible worry is the robustness of our 
results to the chosen instrument. Consequently, we experimented with an instrument that 
contains program information from all states adjacent to those in which the firm operates (not 
just states that are neither upwind nor downwind). We further experimented with instruments 
that contained program information from nearby, yet non-upwind, states and nearby, yet non-
downwind, states. For all regression analyses, these more general instrument generated results 
similar in sign and significance to those reported in Tables 2 and 3. Coefficients, however, were 
typically larger in magnitude.  
Another possible concern is the sharpness of our study’s program variables. Perhaps 
utilities were broadly aware of the disclosure programs prior to their effective date and changed 
their behavior ahead of time. Of course, if utilities had already completely responded to 
disclosure programs before the effective dates, it would be difficult to reconcile the observed 
responses in our analyses. However, as a sensitivity test, we repeated all analyses with program   25
variables that reflect the dates the programs were enacted. In general, we find qualitatively 
similar results (in signs and significance) to those reported here, but magnitudes are frequently 
smaller. 
Our key program variable is constructed by weighting each firm’s state-level disclosure 
program status by the percentage of sales that occur in each state. A possible apprehension is that 
the percentage of a firm’s sales attributable to each state may change in response to the program 
itself. This would introduce bias. However, if we replace our program variable with a 0/1 dummy 
indicating whether any of a firm’s sales are subject to disclosure, we find qualitatively similar 
results. 
Finally, in our analysis we control for the possibility of persistence with fixed effects and 
the possibility of systematic changes in technology with time dummies. However, as a sensitivity 
check, we include an auto-regressive term lagged one year to help control for unobserved 
technology shifts. Including this lagged discharge variable did not substantively change the 
results; signs, significance, and approximate magnitude are similar to those reported. 
6.3  The Impacts of Disclosure: Further Exploratory Analysis 
The regressions in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that disclosure programs reduce fossil fuel 
usage and increase clean fuel usage on average. However, it may be informative to explore these 
effects in more detail. Consequently, in this section, we first use regressions with interactions to 
explore whether the impact of information programs on fuel mix depends upon customer 
composition. We then explore the impact of disclosure policies beyond the mean; we utilize 
conditional quantile regressions to investigate program effects on the entire range of the fuel mix 
distribution.   26
Regression Models with Interactions 
Are disclosure program impacts conditional on customer composition? Our goal here is 
to examine whether the effect of disclosure programs depends upon a firm’s proportion of sales 
to residential consumers. Consequently, we regress fuel mix proportion measures on the percent 
of the firm’s sales subject to disclosure, the proportion of the firm’s sales to residential 
consumers, an interaction of the policy variable with the residential variable, fixed effects, and 
other covariates. More formally, we consider the basic regression model   
yit = Ditδ + Ritγ + DitRit η + Xitβ +αi + εit. Dit still represents the proportion of firm i’s sales that 
are subject to an effective disclosure program in period t, Rit represents the proportion of firm i’s 
sales going to residential customers, and the elements of the row vector Xit include all of the 
non-program explanatory variables. 
Since both the program variable Dit and its interaction DitRit may be statistically 
endogenous, we again employ instrumental variables regressions. One instrument remains the 
same. Our second instrument is the interaction of the first with the residential variable. Since this 
interaction in not a linear combination of the first instrument, it is as valid as the primary 
instrument itself. Results for aggregate categories are presented in Table 4. Computed standard 
errors are heteroskedastic-consistent. T-statistics appear in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Disclosure & Customer Composition Instrumental Variable Regression Results 
  Dependent variables
 
  Percent Fossil Fuels
  Percent Clean Fuels
  Percent Nuclear
 
 
   






















Season Dummies  3 Season Dummies 
Year Dummies  8 Year Dummies
 
Fixed Effects  144 Firm-Level Fixed Effects
 
a The dependent variables are the percentage of fuel mix attributable to the source indicated in the column heading. 
The key independent variable, the disclosure program variable, ranges from 0 to 1. It indicates the percentage of 
firm sales subject to operational disclosure programs. 
b Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
c Analyses use 13,957 observations from 143 firms over the 108 sample months. 2 firms are missing residential data. 
 
Table 4 coefficients on the un-interacted residential variable indicate that, in the absence 
of any disclosure program, an increase in sales to residential customers increases the proportion 
of fuel mix attributable to nuclear energy and decreases the proportion attributable to clean fuels. 
Coefficients on the un-interacted disclosure program variable indicate that, when firms sell to no 
residential customers, programs reduce the proportion of usage attributable to fossil fuels, reduce 
the proportion of usage attributable to clean fuels, and increase the proportion of usage 
attributable to nuclear energy. As always, however, some care should be exercised interpreting 
coefficients conditioned on zeroed variables. There are relatively few observations in which 
firms sell to no residential customers. 
The interaction results in Table 4 indicate that the impact of disclosure programs on both 
clean fuel usage and fossil fuel usage becomes more positive as the percentage of residential 
customers rises. In other words, as firms proportionately serve more residential customers, clean 
fuel program responses become stronger (more positive). Alternatively, as firms proportionately 
serve more residential customers, fossil fuel program responses become weaker (less negative).   28
These results are not inconsistent. Examining the last column of Table 4, we see that the 
interaction coefficient for nuclear energy is negative and statistically significant. As firms 
proportionately serve more residential customers, any nuclear program responses become weaker 
(less positive). In other words, disclosure programs induce considerably smaller increases in 
nuclear fuel usage when firms’ residential customer proportions are high (relative to the average 
program response). 
Marginal disclosure program impacts clarify the interpretation of the results in Table 4. 
At the first quartile of the residential customer variable, the marginal impact of disclosure on 
clean fuel usage is +0.024.
11 At the median of this variable, the marginal impact of disclosure is 
+0.086, at the third quartile, the marginal impact of disclosure is +0.142, and at the 90
th 
percentile, the marginal impact of disclosure is +0.213. Thus, clean fuel program response 
becomes stronger (more positive) as firms proportionately serve more residential customers. The 
marginal impact of disclosure on fossil fuel usage is -0.252 at the first quartile of the residential 
variable, -0.209 at the median, -0.170 at the third quartile, and -0.120 at the 90
th percentile. 
Therefore, fossil fuel program response becomes weaker (less negative) as firms proportionately 
serve more residential customers. Finally, the marginal impact of disclosure on nuclear fuel 
usage is +0.223 at the first quartile of the residential variable, +0.163 at the median, +0.101 at 
the third quartile, and +0.021 at the 90
th percentile. Any nuclear fuel program response becomes 
weaker (less positive) as firms proportionately serve more residential customers. 
                         
11 For the percent of firm’s sales subject to residential consumers, Q25=0.281, Q50=.330, Q75=.374, and 
Q90=.430.   29
Conditional Quantile Regressions 
Do disclosure program impacts vary across the fuel-mix distribution? Our goal here is to 
examine whether the effect of disclosure programs depends upon firms’ pre-existing fuel mix 
portfolios. For example, do disclosure programs impact dirty firms the same way they impact 
cleaner firms? Therefore, we use Koenker and Bassett (1978)’s conditional quantile regressions. 
In our context, quantile regressions decompose the mean response revealed by the linear 
regression results in Table 2 into changes across the entire probability distribution of fuel mix 
levels. In particular, conditional quantile regressions allow us to estimate different slope 
coefficients for different fuel mix quantiles. For example, a regression on the 50
th percentile 
estimates the effect of disclosure on the sample median of the dependent variable in question.  
An additional advantage of conditional quantile regressions in our context relates to 
censoring. In our data, some observations have proportional clean fuel usage at or near 0 and 
proportional fossil fuel usage at or near 1. Less commonly, some observations have proportional 
clean fuel usage at or near 1 and proportional fossil fuel usage at or near 0. Such censoring may 
bias least squares regressions, but the weighted least absolute deviation estimation underlying the 
quantile regression method minimizes or eliminates the impact of censoring on the uncensored 
quantiles. 
More formally, we consider the linear model for the conditional quantile function, 
(| , ) () () ()
it yi t i t i t i t QD D τ ατ δτ τ =+ + XX β  for τ between 0 and 1. Dit still represents the 
proportion of firm i’s sales that are subject to an effective disclosure program in period t and the 
elements of the row vector Xit include all of the non-program explanatory variables. Note that we 
omit firm-level fixed effects. Including firm-level fixed effects in quantile regressions would 
yield coefficients that indicate an average firm’s program responses across the distribution of   30
departures from that individual firm’s typical fuel mix levels. So, a 75
th percentile coefficient 
would be the disclosure response when firms are using a particularly large proportion of fuel 
from source Y, relative to their own typical levels of fuel Y. In contrast, our purpose is to 
investigate what happens to the overall emissions distribution. In other words, we wish to 
examine if the fuel mix distribution shifts more strongly for firms that typically use high 
proportions of fuel Y.  
Of course, it is still possible that the program variable Dit is statistically endogenous. 
Therefore, in addition to standard conditional quantile regressions, we perform instrumental 
variable quantile regression. For basic quantile regressions, estimation and inference follows 
Koenker and Bassett (1982) and Rogers (1993). For instrumental variable quantile regression, we 
use the implementation by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004) for estimation and inference. 
Table 5 presents quantile regression results for the impact of disclosure programs on 






th percentiles because these represent the relevant range for this distribution. There is little 
variation below the 20
th percentile, as 15 percent of observations reflect proportional fossil fuel 
usage at or near 0. Similarly, there is little variation above the 60
th percentile, as nearly 40
 
percent of observations reflect fossil fuel usage at or near 1 (100%). 
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Table 5. Conditional Quantile Regressions: Fossil Fuels 
  Std. Quantile Regression  Instrumental Var. Quantile Regression 
  Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 
            
















































































Year Dummies  8 Year Dummies  8 Year Dummies 
    
a The dependent variables are the percentage of fuel mix attributable to the source indicated in the column heading. 
The key independent variable, the disclosure program variable, ranges from 0 to 1. It indicates the percentage of 
firm sales subject to operational disclosure programs. 
b A superscript * indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
c All analyses consist of 14,168 observations from 145 firms over the 108 sample months. 
 
Results in table 5 demonstrate that the disclosure program point estimates tend to 
decrease as one moves up the distribution of fossil fuel emissions. These differences are 
frequently both statistically and economically significant. For example, all matched pair 
differences except (Q20, Q30) are statistically significant for the standard quantile regressions. 
Further, the fossil fuel program response it the 20
th percentile is 1.6 (IV QREG point estimates) 
to 2.2 (standard QREG point estimates) times greater than the response at the 50
th percentile. 
Results in Table 2 indicated that disclosure programs induce reductions in fossil fuel usage on 
average. The quantile regression results in table 5 suggest that it is firms that already use 
relatively limited amounts of fossil fuels that reduce fossil fuels the most in response to 
disclosure programs. 
Results for clean fuel responses to disclosure programs largely mirror the results in Table 
5. Point estimates generally increase as one moves up the distribution of clean fuel usage, 
suggesting that disclosure programs induce firms that already use substantial amounts of clean 
fuel to increase clean fuel usage the most. For both fossil fuel and clean fuel responses, care   32
should be taken interpreting these results. Technically, the quantile regressions compare 
differences in the absent-disclosure and present-disclosure distributions. Rank preservation is not 
guaranteed. While it is practically quite likely that firms that are at high quantiles of the absent-
disclosure distribution also appear at similarly high quantiles of the corresponding present-
disclosure distribution, this is not required. Thus, quantile regression results merely suggest that 
firms that already use substantial amounts of fossil fuels reduce fossil fuel usage the most in 
response to disclosure programs. 
7.  Discussion and conclusion 
On the margin, we find a statistically and economically significant impact of information 
disclosure programs in the electricity industry. We find that mandatory disclosure programs 
decrease firms’ percentage of generation attributable to fossil fuels and increase firms’ 
percentage of generation attributable to clean fuels like hydroelectric and renewables. As the 
proportion of the average firm’s sales subject to disclosure requirements increases 10 percent, the 
average proportion of generation attributable to fossil fuels drops approximately 1.3 percentage 
points. Further, as the proportion of the average firm’s sales subject to disclosure increases 10 
percent, the average proportion of generation attributable to clean fuels rises approximately 1.5 
percentage points. 
We also find that disclosure program responses are sensitive to customer composition and 
pre-exiting fuel mix levels. Firms’ clean fuel program responses become considerably stronger 
(more positive) as the firm sells to more residential consumers. Fossil fuel program responses 
become considerably weaker (less negative) as the proportion of sales to residential consumers 
increases. Further, disclosure program responses differ across the fuel mix distribution. Results   33
suggest that firms that already use relatively low levels of fossil fuels decrease their fossil fuel 
percentages the most in response to information disclosure policies. For example, the program-
induced decrease in fossil fuel usage is approximately 2 times greater for firms generating 
approximately 38 percent of their energy from fossil fuels than for firms generating 
approximately 83 percent of their energy usage from fossil fuels.  
The key implication arising from our results is that information disclosure programs that 
regularly provide easily interpretable information can be an effective and low cost means of 
achieving policy goals. This result holds even when the provided information already exists in 
the public domain. Further, the result holds when the program targets an impure public good 
with private consumption attributes that are not correlated with public benefits. We find a 
significant impact of mandatory information policies for electricity, and green electricity is 
equivalent to brown electricity as a final consumption product. Information policies like eco- and 
organic- labels frequently target impure environmental public goods, but it is very difficult to 
disentangle disclosure responses attributable to environmental preferences from disclosure 
responses attributable to perceived changes in product quality (like health, safety, and taste).  
Other significant policy implications follow from our results. Most notably, information 
policies may generate significant unintended consequences. For example, particular attention 
must be paid to customer composition when introducing disclosure programs in the electricity 
industry. When utilities serve high proportions of residential consumers, mandatory information 
programs may spur particularly significant increases in clean fuel usage. However, in these 
circumstances, these increases come at the relative expense of nuclear fuel usage and not fossil 
fuel usage. This may be consistent with stakeholder preferences, but it is unlikely to be 
consistent with air pollution-oriented policy goals. Second, the pre-existing fuel mix results   34
suggest that disclosure programs make “clean” firms cleaner while leaving “dirty” firms 
relatively unchanged. If the marginal benefits of pollution abatement are larger at dirty firms 
than at clean firms, disclosure programs may induce inefficient abatement allocations. 
This paper suggests promising avenues for future research that are beyond the present 
scope. First, our results indicate that mandatory information disclosure programs affect the 
economic incentives and the behavior of utilities. However, assessing the full welfare effects of 
information-based policies requires a differentiation between new generation and ownership 
changes. Second, our results and anecdotal evidence suggest direct demand and political 
economic theories provide a credible link between mandatory information disclosure programs 
and fuel mix outcomes. However, a full understanding of the implications of these information-
based policies requires precise identification of the underlying mechanism or mechanisms. Third, 
we demonstrate that information programs affect fuel mix outcomes. While fuel mix is correlated 
with emissions, gauging the social value of the policies involves an empirical evaluation of 
program-induced impacts on environmental quality. Finally, our results are suggestive for other 
settings. However, mandatory provision programs are becoming increasingly common in other 
countries and the extent of policy induced changes may be sensitive to cross-country institutions. 
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